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Taxes on road transport fuels are an important source of revenue for the government.  In 2009-10, 
fuel duty (and the associated VAT) amounted to £29 billion, around 6% of total revenue.  However, 
fuel duty rates – particularly increases in rates – are an emotive topic that generates strong feelings 
on the part of both industry and the public.   
Rapidly rising petrol prices during the second half of the 1990s under the fuel duty escalator led to 
increasing anger, culminating in the so-called “fuel protests” by lorry drivers and farmers in the 
autumn of 2000 (although the withdrawal of the escalator had been announced in November of the 
previous year).  Duty rates – which were reduced slightly in response to the protests – then 
remained almost constant in nominal terms over the next seven years, before starting to rise again 
in 2007-8.  More recently, there have been calls for a fuel price stabiliser to cushion the impact of 
fluctuations in the price of crude oil.  The idea – which was included in the Conservative Part 
manifesto at the 2010 general election and was subject to a Conservative Party consultation 
document in 2008 (Conservative Party, 2008) – is currently being investigated by the Treasury.  
The aim of this briefing note is to provide some objective analysis to inform the debate regarding 
fuel duty.  In particular, the objectives of the note are: 
 assess what the outcomes would have been over the period 2000 – 2010 if the fuel duty 
escalator had not been withdrawn in 1999, in terms of duty rates, petrol prices, petrol 
consumption, CO2 emissions, and tax revenues; 
 design a revenue-neutral fuel price stabiliser that can substantially reduce the short term 
volatility in petrol prices, while preserving the relationship between petrol prices and the long 
run trend in crude oil prices. 
The note comprises three sections.  Section one provides a brief review of the trends in road 
transport fuel prices, demand and taxes over the past twenty years.  This is followed in section two 
by the assessment of the impact of the fuel duty escalator removal.  Finally, section three describes 




1 Trends in road transport fuel prices, demand and taxes 
1.1 Fuel prices 
The retail price of motor fuels has risen steadily over the last twenty years.  However, there has been 
considerable volatility around the long run trend, particularly in later years.  For example, while the 
retail price of premium unleaded petrol increased from just under 40 pence per litre at the start of 
1991 to almost 120 pence per litre in June 2010 (see Figure 1.1) – a real increase of 83%, there were 
significant decreases during 2000/01 and in the second half of 2008.  During the 1990s, the rise in 
the price was driven by increases in fuel duty (see section 1.3).  Over the past ten years, the rise has 
been driven by the increases in the price of crude oil. 
Fuel duty and VAT account for the majority of the retail price – growing from 60% of the total price 
for premium unleaded petrol in 1991 to a peak of 86% in March 1999 (when the fuel duty escalator 
was discontinued), before falling back to around 60% by the beginning of 2010.   
Figure 1.1 Decomposition of retail price of premium unleaded petrol (pence per litre)1 
 
Sources:  Quarterly Energy Prices: June 2010 (DECC) 
   OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics (for crude oil import price) 
 
While there is a clear relationship between the price of crude oil (in sterling) and the retail price of 
petrol, it is highly damped (see Figure 1.2).  Over recent years, the short run elasticity of the pre-tax 
price of petrol with respect to the crude oil price has averaged around 0.6 (see Annex A).  That is, a 
10% increase in the price of crude oil causes the price of petrol leaving the refineries to rise by 
                                                          
1
  The crude oil component of the retail price is based on the assumption that the cost of crude oil is 
apportioned to the various outputs from the refining process on the basis of their respective yields. 
This is equivalent to assuming that one litre of petrol requires the input of one litre of crude oil.  
Refining “value added” includes the costs of all other refining inputs.  As such, it is not the same as the 























VAT Fuel duty Refining "value added" Crude oil
4 
 
around 6% within one month.  The impact on the retail price is much smaller, reflecting the fact that 
fuel duty is specified in absolute terms (i.e. in pence per litre) rather than ad valorem.  This has the 
effect of reducing the short-run elasticity – to around 0.25 over recent years.  Thus, while there has 
been variability in the retail price of petrol around its long-term (upward) trend, it is much less 
volatile than the price of crude oil.   
Figure 1.2  Relationship between crude oil price
(a)
 and petrol prices
(b)
   (index 2005 = 100) 
 
(a) Average sterling price on a cif basis for supplies received by UK refineries from both indigenous and imported sources. 
(b) Premium unleaded petrol 
Source:  Quarterly Energy Prices: June 2010 (DECC) 
 
1.2 Fuel demand 
The total demand for motor fuels (i.e. petrol plus diesel) remained relatively flat from the start of 
1999 to the third quarter of 2007, at around 12 billion litres per quarter, with the negative impact of 
the price increases over the period being offset by the growth in economic activity.2  Since the third 
quarter of 2007 however, there has been a significant decline in demand, with a 10% reduction in 
retail sales and an 18% reduction in commercial sales.3   
While the breakdown of demand between retail and commercial sales has remained relatively stable 
over the entire period, there has been a significant shift in the mix of retail sales from petrol to 
diesel, with the latter’s share growing from 22% in 1991 to 43% by 2010. 
 
                                                          
2
  Between Q1 1999 and Q3 2007, the sales weighted average price of motor fuels increased by 27% in 
real terms.  Over the same period, economic activity (as measured by the volume index for GDP) grew 
by 26%.  
3
   Retail sales are those deliveries made to petrol stations, etc., mainly for resale to final consumers. 
Commercial sales are those deliveries made direct to a consumer for use in their own business, e.g. to 
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Figure 1.3 Demand for motor transport fuels (million litres per quarter) 
 
Source:  Table 3.5, Energy Trends: September 2010 (DECC) 
 
1.3 Fuel taxes 
Fuel duty rates increased significantly between 1991 and 2000 (see Figure 1.4) – due largely to the 
fuel duty escalator, which was introduced in 1993 and was used to determine increases in fuel duty 
rates until 1999.4  Following the withdrawal of the escalator, duty rates remained relatively flat (in 
nominal terms) until the end of 2007, when they started to rise again. 
Figure 1.4 Duty rates (pence per litre) 
 
Source:  Hydrocarbon Oils: Historic Duty Rates (HMRC) 
                                                          
4
  The fuel duty escalator was announced in the March 1993 Budget Statement and was first applied at 
the end of November 1993.  It was last applied in March 1999 and was formally withdrawn in the 
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Under the escalator, increases in duty rates were required to exceed inflation (as measured by the 
increase in the Retail Price Index); initially by at least 3%, then by at least 5% (from November 1994), 
and finally by 6% (from March 1998). 





% change Basis for increase 
Mar 1991 22.41 15.0% No stated basis  
Mar 1992 23.42 4.5% Increase RPI (Dec 1991)  
Mar 1993 25.76 10.0% No stated basis  












Nov 1994 30.44 7.5% At least RPI (Sep 1994) + 5% 
Jan 1995 31.32 2.9% Ad hoc 
Nov 1995 34.30 9.5% At least RPI (Sep 1995) + 5% 
Nov 1996 38.86 7.5% At least RPI (Sep 1996) + 5% 
Jul 1997 40.28 9.3% At least RPI + 5% 
Mar 1998 43.99 9.2% Expected RPI (Sep 1998) + 6% 
Mar 1999 47.21 7.3% Expected RPI (Sep 1999) + 6% 
Mar 2000 48.82 3.4% Expected RPI (Sep 2000)  
Source:  House of Commons (2000) 
 
The revenue raised by fuel duty remained relatively stable from the start of 1999 to the end of 2006, 
at just under £6 billion per quarter (see Figure 1.5). Including the VAT levied on the duty, annual 
revenues averaged around £27 billion over this period; with the large majority (i.e. around 80%) 
being raised from retail sales. 
Since 2007 there has been a slight increase in revenues, as the increase in duty rates has been 
partially offset by the reduction in demand.  For the year ended Q2 2010, revenue totalled £29.5 
billion (including VAT).  
Figure 1.5 Road transport fuel duty revenue (£ million per quarter) 
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2 Impact of fuel duty escalator removal 
In this section, we consider what the outcomes would have been over the period 2000 – 2010 if the 
fuel duty escalator had not been withdrawn in 1999.  Three alternative scenarios for the escalator 
are assessed: 
a) RPI + 3% 
b) RPI + 5% 
c) RPI + 6% 
In each case, it is assumed the duty rates are revised in March of each year (starting in March 2000) 
and are based on the (actual) increase in RPI for the following September.5  In keeping with the 
actual duty rates, it is assumed that the separate (higher) duty rate for super unleaded petrol was 
abolished in March 2001, and that thereafter, there was a common duty rate for unleaded petrol 
and diesel.6 
Figure 2.1 shows the impact of continuing the escalator on fuel duty rates.  Under the 3% escalator, 
the duty rate rises to 88 pence per litre by June 2010, while it rises to almost 120 pence per litre 
under the 6% escalator.  These rates compare with an actual rate for that month of 57 pence per 
litre.  
Figure 2.1 Impact on fuel duty rate: unleaded petrol and diesel   (pence per litre) 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the resultant impact on the retail price of premium unleaded petrol, assuming that 
both the pre-tax price and the prevailing rate of VAT are unaffected by the continuation of the 
                                                          
5
  This is consistent with the way in which the escalator was calculated in its final two years, when the 
increase was based on the expected increase in RPI for the following September. 
6
  As with the actual rates, the duty differential for lead replacement petrol (LRP) is maintained until the 
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escalator.  The retail price rises to 154 pence per litre by June 2010 under the 3% escalator, 
compared with the actual price in that month of 117 pence per litre.  Under the 6% escalator, the 
retail price rises to 191 pence per litre (i.e. 63% higher). 
Figure 2.2 Impact on retail price of premium unleaded petrol (pence per litre) 
 
 
The higher retail prices have a significant impact on the demand for road transport fuels (see Figure 
2.3), with total demand declining to around 8.6 billion litres per quarter by Q2 2010 under the 6% 
escalator, almost 25% lower than the actual figure.7  Under the 3% escalator, demand falls to around 
9.7 billion litres per quarter (almost 15% less than the actual level). 
Figure 2.3 Impact on total demand for road transport fuels (million litres per quarter) 
 
                                                          
7
  The impact on demand is calculated using the average price elasticities provided by Goodwin et al 
(2004) – i.e. a short-term elasticity of -0.25 and a long-term elasticity of -0.64.  Details of the 
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The reduction in demand is reflected in a corresponding reduction in CO2 emissions from road 
transport (see Table 2.1).  By Q2 2010, cumulative emissions of CO2 are 103 million tonnes lower 
under the 3% escalator and 156 million lower under the 6% escalator; while annual emissions by the 
end of the period are 16 million tonnes lower and 26 million tonnes lower respectively.  The latter 
figure would have represented a 5.4% decrease in total UK emissions, all else being equal.8  
Table 2.1  Reduction in CO2 emissions versus actual (million tonnes CO2) 




RPI + 3% 103 16 
RPI + 5% 139 23 
RPI + 6% 156 26 
 
The revenue raised by fuel duty and the associated VAT increases to around £10 billion per quarter 
by Q2 2010 under the 3% escalator, and to around £12 billion under the 6% escalator, compared to 
the actual figure of £7.6 billion (see Figure 2.4).  Cumulatively, revenues would have been £61 billion 
higher than the actual figure under the 3% escalator and around £100 billion higher under the 6% 
escalator.  The additional annual revenue under the 6% escalator by the end of the period – at £15.2 
billion – would have been sufficient to fund a reduction in employers’ national insurance 
contributions of around 25%, or a reduction in household income tax of around 10%.9, 10    
Figure 2.4 Impact on duty and tax revenues (£ million per quarter) 
 
                                                          
8
  The provisional estimate of UK total CO2 emissions for 2009 is 481 million tonnes. Source: DECC 
Statistical Release, 25 March 2010. 
9
  Employers’ compulsory national insurance contributions were £54.6 billion in 2009 (£57.1 billion in 
2008), while household income taxes were £138.0 billion (£150.3 billion in 2008).  Source: United 
Kingdom National Accounts “The Blue Book”, 2010 edition. 
10
  The ability of fuel duty to replace revenues from other taxes has been noted by the Green Fiscal 
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3 Fuel price stabiliser 
While the relationship is highly damped (see section 1.1), fluctuations in the crude oil price do feed 
through to the retail prices of motor fuels.  This can cause very sharp short-term increases in retail 
prices – particularly when combined with rises in fuel duty rates.  In this section, we consider the 
design of a “price stabiliser” that would substantially reduce the short-run volatility in the retail price 
of petrol, while preserving the relationship between the price and the long run trend in crude oil 
prices.  
3.1 Decomposition of crude oil price 
The crude oil price in any month can be decomposed into two additive components: the long term 
trend price and a short term deviation from the trend (see Annex B).  Between 1991 and 2010, there 
was a four-fold increase in the long term trend price, with virtually all of the growth occurring over 
the last ten years (see Figure 3.1a).   
There is substantial variation around the long term trend price – with deviations (in both directions) 
of up to 60% (see Figure 3.1b).  The actual price was particularly high (i.e. deviation from the trend 
greater than +20%) in 1996, 2000/1, 2005/6 and 2007/8.  It was particularly low (i.e. deviation more 
negative than -20%) in 1998/9 and 2008/9.  The deviations are characterised by positive serial 
correlation, with alternating “runs” of successive positive and negative values – averaging around 
sixteen months duration. 
The average value of the absolute deviation around the trend line (i.e. in pence per litre) over the 
period 1991-2010 is zero by definition, while the average value of the percentage deviation is close 
to zero (i.e. +0.6%).11   
Figure 3.1 Crude oil price 
a) Long-run trend  (pence per litre)      b) Deviation from trend (%) 
  
Source: Quarterly Energy Prices: June 2010 (DECC) 
                                                          
11















































3.2 Design of price stabiliser 
The pre-tax price of petrol in any month (i.e. pt) can be decomposed into four additive components 
(see Annex D): 
pt = At + Bt + Ct + Dt                      … (1) 
where 
At is a constant that declines over time 
Bt represents the impact of the long term trend price of crude oil 
Ct represents the impact of the short term deviations in the crude oil price 
Dt represents the impact of other unidentified factors 
The first two components are always positive.  Together, they are equal to the long term trend price 
for that period.  The other two components may be positive or negative, with their combined value 
representing the deviation from the trend price.  For example, Figure 3.2 shows the decomposition 
of the pre-tax price of premium unleaded petrol over the period 1995 to 2010.    
Figure 3.2 Decomposition of the pre-tax price of premium unleaded petrol  
(pence per litre) 
 
 
The objective of the price stabiliser (st) is to remove the impact of the short term deviations in the 
crude oil price (Ct), while preserving the long term trend price (and other unidentified factors).  That 
is: 
pt  +  st = At + Bt + Dt                      … (2) 
Combining (1) and (2) gives the following expression for the price stabiliser: 
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The stabiliser is positive (i.e. equivalent to a tax) when the (smoothed) deviation from the long term 
crude oil trend price is negative (i.e. Ct < 0).  It is negative (i.e. equivalent to a subsidy) when the 
deviation is positive (i.e. Ct > 0).   
Figure 3.3 shows the impact of the stabiliser on the pre-tax price of petrol and on the total demand 
for road transport fuels.  While the introduction of the stabiliser significantly reduces the volatility of 
the pre-tax petrol price, it does not eliminate it entirely due to the impact of the other unidentified 
factors.  The stabiliser has minimal impact on demand due the sluggishness of the response to price 
changes (see Annex C). 
Figure 3.3 Impact of stabiliser  
a)   pre-tax price of premium unleaded petrol  (pence per litre) 
     
 b)   total demand for road transport fuels (billion litres per quarter) 





















































3.3 Revenue implications 
Figure 3.4 shows the magnitude of the fuel stabiliser (in pence per litre) since 1994, calculated 
retrospectively using actual (known) fuel prices.  Also shown is the five-year moving average value of 
the stabiliser from the year 1999 onwards.   
In general, the value of the stabiliser lies between plus and minus five pence per litre.  The exception 
to this was in 2008-9, when the value of the stabiliser declined to minus seventeen pence per litre in 
July 2008 following the doubling of the crude oil price over the previous twelve months, before 
increasing to plus ten pence in January 2009 as the oil price collapsed in the second half of 2008.12   
The five-year moving average value was close to zero between 1999 and 2004.  It then rose to 
around plus one pence per litre by the end of 2007 before falling rapidly to around minus one and a 
half pence per litre by the end of 2008. 
Figure 3.4 Retrospective fuel duty stabiliser for premium unleaded petrol 
(pence per litre) 
 
 
The impact of the stabiliser on tax revenues depends on the demand for fuel in each period as well 
as the stabiliser values.  However, as was shown in Figure 1.3, the total demand for road transport 
fuels remained relatively flat up to 2008, before declining by around 8% over the next two and a half 
years.  Consequently, the impact on tax revenues follows a very similar pattern to that of the 
stabiliser.  Figure 3.5 shows the total impact on tax revenue (i.e. fuel duty and VAT) from 1999 
onwards, assuming the stabiliser value is the same for all fuel types (i.e. that calculated for premium 
unleaded petrol), together with the five-year moving average from 2004 onwards.   
Prior to 2008, the revenue impact fluctuated between plus and minus £500 million per quarter.  In 
2008 and 2009 the impacts were much greater, reflecting the increased magnitudes of the stabiliser 
in those years.  However, in terms of the impacts over tax-years (i.e. April – March) the picture is 
more even, varying between a maximum of plus £2 billion in 2003-4 to a minimum of minus £2 
                                                          
12
  The crude oil price increased from 22.8 pence per litre in June 2007 to 42.3 pence per litre in June 
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billion in 2008-9.  The five year moving average value fluctuated between plus and minus £180 
million per quarter (i.e. less than 3% of the actual duty and associated VAT revenue collected).   
Figure 3.5 Impact of retrospective stabiliser on tax revenues (£ million per quarter) 
 
 
3.4 Practical considerations 
The stabiliser defined by equation (3) – and shown in Figure 3.4 – requires knowledge of the 
deviations from the trend crude oil price in all periods – including the period to which it applies.  As 
such, it can only be calculated retrospectively when the actual prices are available.  In practice, the 
value of the stabiliser for any period must be set in advance, before the deviations for the latest 
periods are known.   
Given the delay in obtaining price data and the lead-times required for implementation, it is likely 
that the latest available data will be three months old.  For example, assuming that the stabiliser for 
March would have to be set in early February, the latest available data would relate to December.  
Consequently, it is necessary to forecast the values of the deviations for the last three months.   
Fortunately, the serial correlation of the deviations allows this to be done with a reasonable degree 
of accuracy (see Annex D) and these forecasts can then be used – with the actual values for the 
preceding months – to calculate a “prospective stabiliser” value. 
Figure 3.6 compares the prospective stabiliser values with the retrospective values.  There is a 
reasonably strong relationship between the two values for the majority of the period – with the 
correlation between the two time series being 0.74.  However, the prospective stabiliser has the 
incorrect sign in 31 of the 195 constituent months (i.e. 16%) – exacerbating the deviations in those 
months rather than attenuating them as intended.  This was particularly significant in November and 
December 2008 when the prospective stabiliser failed to reflect the unprecedented decline in crude 
oil prices in the second half of that year.  While only occurring in a small minority of cases, the 
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 Figure 3.6 Comparison of retrospective and prospective stabilisers – premium unleaded petrol 
(pence per litre) 
 
 
Despite the reasonably good fit to the retrospective stabiliser, the prospective stabiliser is much less 
effective at removing the volatility in the pre-tax petrol price (see Figure 3.7).  It removes only 60% 
of the volatility due to the deviations in the crude oil price from its long term trend – compared to 
the 100% removal under the retrospective stabiliser (see Annex D)  Furthermore, as noted above, in 
those months in which it has the incorrect sign, the prospective stabiliser actually exacerbates the 
volatility.  This is particularly apparent for November – December 2008.  If these two unusual 
months are omitted, the effectiveness of the prospective stabiliser improves to 65%.  
Figure 3.7 Impact of prospective stabiliser on the pre-tax price of premium unleaded petrol 
(pence per litre) 

















































The retail price of motor fuels has risen steadily over the last twenty years.  During the 1990s, the 
rise in the price was driven by increases in fuel duty.  Over the past ten years, the rise has been 
driven by the increases in the price of crude oil.   
There is a clear upward trend in the underlying price of crude oil – with a fourfold increase over the 
past ten years.  This trend has remained stable over time and there is no reason to expect that it will 
not continue in the medium term (i.e. over the next five years).  However, there is considerable 
volatility around the long term trend price, with deviations up to 60% in either direction. 
The removal of the fuel duty escalator in 1999 had a significant impact on the trajectory of petrol 
prices over the past ten years.  If the escalator had been continued through to the present, the retail 
price of petrol would have been considerably higher than the current level.  This would have 
resulted in a significant reduction in the demand for road transport fuels – and hence CO2 emissions 
from road transport – and a substantial increase in the revenue raised from fuel duty and the 
associated VAT.   
In particular, if the escalator had continued at 6% (the rate applying at the time of its removal), the 
retail price of premium unleaded petrol would have risen to over 190 pence per litre by the middle 
of 2010.  Annual demand for road transport fuels would have reduced by around a quarter 
compared to the actual figure, while annual CO2 emissions would have been 26 million tonnes lower, 
which would have represented a 5% reduction in the UK’s total emissions.  Furthermore, the 
additional duty / VAT revenue raised in 2010 – at just over £15 billion – would have been sufficient 
to reduce employers’ national insurance contributions by around 25%, or reduce household income 
tax by around 10%.  Alternatively, the cumulative additional revenue over the decade – at around 
£100 billion – would have made a major contribution to reducing the current budget deficit. 
While the relationship is highly damped, fluctuations in the crude oil price do feed through to the 
retail price of petrol.  This can cause very sharp short-term increases in retail prices – particularly 
when combined with rising fuel duty rates.  However, it is possible to isolate the impacts of the short 
term deviations in the crude oil price on the pre-tax price of petrol and hence design a fuel price 
stabiliser that will offset them.   
With perfect knowledge of crude oil prices, the stabiliser will remove all of the volatility.  However, 
in practice, the value of the stabiliser for any period must be set in advance, before the deviations 
for the latest months are known.  Consequently, it is necessary to forecast the deviations (and hence 
the crude oil prices) for these months.  While it is possible it is possible to forecast these deviations 
with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the resultant stabiliser is only capable of removing around 60-
65% of the price volatility.  Furthermore, in some months, the stabiliser has the incorrect sign, 
exacerbating the price volatility rather than attenuating it as intended.  The sensitivity of the 
stabiliser’s effectiveness to the accuracy of the forecast deviations in crude oil prices means that the 
value would have to be adjusted monthly as the latest price data becomes available. 
The stabilizer is broadly revenue neutral over any five-year period.  However, it is important to note 
that this is only because it compensates for the volatility in the crude oil price around its long term 
upward trend.  Any attempt to stabilise the price of petrol at a particular level (in either nominal or 
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real terms) would have a significant negative impact on revenues.  For example, freezing the price of 
petrol in real terms (i.e. increasing in line with RPI) at its December 2005 level (see Figure 4.1), would 
have cost the government a cumulative £8.4 billion in lower duty and VAT revenues by the middle of 
2010.  The cost in any particular financial year depends on the fluctuations in the oil price, but it 
would have been as high as £3.6 billion in 2008-9.  Furthermore, the resultant increased 
consumption would have generated an additional 16 million tonnes of CO2.  
Figure 4.1 Decomposition of retail price of premium unleaded petrol (pence per litre) 
Frozen in real terms from December 2005 onwards   
 
 
If the price had been fixed in nominal terms (i.e. with no increase for general inflation) then the 
impacts would have been significantly greater, with revenue reducing by a cumulative £23 billion by 
the middle of 2010 (£7.9 billion in 2008-9) and cumulative CO2 emissions increasing by 23 million 
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Annex A Relationship between crude oil price and retail 
price of petrol 
The relationship between the pre-tax price of petrol (i.e. the ex-refinery price) at time t and the 
sterling price of crude oil is assumed to take the autoregressive form: 
pt = a  + b qt  +  c pt-1  +  d tt  +  t                  … (1) 
where p is the pre-tax petrol price (pence per litre) 
q is the crude oil price (pence per litre) 
t is a time trend variable (expressed in years) 
  represents other unidentified factors influencing price   ~ N[0,] 
a, b, c, d are parameters 
The lagged pre-tax price of petrol of petrol (pt-1) is included as an explanatory variable to allow for 
the possibility that the price does not adjust immediately to changes in the crude oil price.   
 
The short-run impact on the pre-tax petrol price of a change to the crude oil price is given by: 
dpt
d t
           b 
 




           
b
1   c
 
  
The parameters were estimated econometrically for premium unleaded petrol using monthly price 
data published in the June 2010 edition of Quarterly Energy Prices (DECC).  As is often the case with 
autoregressive models, the residuals () exhibit serial correlation and hence parameter estimates 
derived under standard OLS estimation are biased and inconsistent.   Consequently, the equation 
was estimated using the Hatanaka two-step procedure for autoregressive models with serial 
correlation (see Kennedy, 2003).  The resultant parameter estimates are shown in Table A1, along 
with their respective t-statistics and p-values, and the R-squared value for the transformed equation.    
Table A1 Parameter estimates: premium unleaded petrol 
Variable Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Constant a 6.358 10.30 < 0.001 
Crude oil price b 0.876 18.21 < 0.001 
Lagged pre-tax petrol price c 0.177 4.39 < 0.001 
Time trend d -0.060 -0.85 0.40 
R
2
  =  0.87 
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With the exception of the time trend, all of the coefficients are highly significant and the estimated 
equation explains 87% of the variation in the pre-tax price of premium unleaded petrol (for the 
transformed model).  This is reflected in Figure A1, which shows a close fit between the modelled 
values with the actual pre-tax prices over the period.   
Figure A1  Comparison of actual and fitted pre-tax petrol prices for premium unleaded petrol 
    (pence per litre) 
 
 
The estimated short-run impact of a change to the crude oil price is 0.88 – i.e. around 90% of any 
increase in the price of crude oil is passed on immediately in the pre-tax price of petrol.  The 
estimated long-run impact is 1.06 (i.e. 0.88 / (1 – 0.18).  This is not significantly different from one, 
implying that in the long-run, any change in the price of crude oil is passed on in full. 
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where mt is the percentage mark-up in period t.   
Because of the linear relationship between the crude oil price and the pre-tax price of petrol (1), the 
mark-up varies over time.  While there is considerable variation from month to month, there has 
been a general decline over the past twenty years (see Figure A2) with the mark-up for premium 
unleaded petrol falling from around 150% to around 40%.  This is reflected in an increase in the 




























Figure A2  Percentage mark-up: pre-tax petrol price of premium unleaded petrol versus crude oil price 
 
The relationship between the pre-tax price and the retail price of petrol is given by: 
rt = (1 + vt) [ pt + dt ]                     … (2) 
where r is the retail petrol price (pence per litre) 
p is the pre-tax petrol price (pence per litre) 
v  is the VAT % 
d is the fuel duty rate (pence per litre)   
 
Assuming that the fuel duty rate is set independently of the price of crude oil then the short-run and 
long-run impacts on the retail price of petrol of a change to the crude oil price are respectively:  
drt
d t
            1   vt   
dpt
d t
          1   vt   b                     
dr
d 
                     
b
1   c
    
Thus, the impacts on the retail price are equal to the impacts on the pre-tax price, grossed up for 
VAT. 
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    t
   
where t = dt / pt  is the value of fuel duty as a proportion of the pre-tax petrol price (i.e. the “fuel 
duty mark-up”.   
Thus, the fuel duty acts to dampen the effect of the changes in the price of crude oil.  Again, the 
value of t varies over time since the fuel duty only changes periodically while the pre-tax petrol 
price changes continuously (see Figure A2).  Over the 1990s it increased from just over 100% to 500% 

























sharply and has averaged around 150% in recent years.  Consequently, the short run elasticity of the 
retail petrol price declined from 0.18 to 0.06 in 1999, before rising to its current value of 0.26.  





























Petrol pre-tax Fuel Duty Mark-up % (LHS)
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Annex B  Long run trend for crude oil price 
The price of crude oil at time t is assumed to be given by: 
qt = q t  +  t   q t  =   +  t +  t
2                … (3) 
where 
q  is the long-run trend price of crude oil (pence per litre)   
  is the short-run deviation from the trend price,   ~ N[0,] 
 
The parameters are estimated econometrically using monthly price data published in the June 2010 
edition of Quarterly Energy Prices (DECC).  The resultant parameter estimates are shown in Table B1, 
along with their respective t-statistics and p-values, and the R2 value for the equation.  While the 
residuals around the fitted values (et = qt   t) exhibit significant autocorrelation (see Figure B1), the 
estimated parameter values are unbiased and consistent.13  Consequently, the estimated trend price 
values calculated using these estimates are also unbiased and consistent.    
 
Table B1  Parameter estimates 
Variable Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Constant  8.655 13.58 < 0.001 
Time in months (Jan 1991 = 0)  -1.101 -7.26 < 0.001 
Time squared  0.120 15.90 < 0.001 
R
2
  =  0.85 
Figure B1  Residuals (pence per litre) 
 
 
                                                          
13
  Autocorrelation causes the R
2
 value and the t-statistics for the estimates to be overstated (and hence 
























It is assumed that the autocorrelation of the residual term (i.e. the deviation) is AR(3), i.e. 
et  =  1 et-1  +  2 et-2  +  3 et-3  +  t   where  ~ N[0,]       … (4) 
The values of the parameters are estimated econometrically using the residuals from the estimation 
of the trend equation (3).  The resultant parameter estimates are shown in Table B2, along with their 
respective t-statistics and p-values and the R2 value for the equation. All of the coefficients are 
significant and the equation explains almost 90% of the variation in the residuals.   
   
Table B1  Parameter estimates 
Variable Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
et-1 1 1.260 19.19 < 0.001 
et-2 2 -0.257 -2.45 0.015 
et-3 3 -0.132 -2.00 0.047 
R
2
  =  0.88 
 
The values of the parameters in the trend price equation (3) have remained relatively stable over 
time, with very little difference between the long term trend lines calculated using the data up to 
the end of 2005 and using the data up to June 2010 (see Figure B2). 
   
Figure B2  Stability of long run trend price of crude oil 
 
 
Denoting the percentage deviation from the fitted trend price (  t) by gt then: 
E(gt)  =  E[ ( qt    t )    t ]  =  E( qt     t )    1  
Noting that the value of qt is fixed in repeated sampling and that the inverse function is strictly 






















Trend 1991-2005 Trend 1991-2010
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E(gt)  >  qt    E (  t )     1  =  qt  / qt)     1  =  0 
Thus, the expected value of the percentage deviation at a particular point in time is greater than 
zero.  Of course, in any particular sample, it may be positive or negative.  Furthermore, the mean 
value across time periods is not generally equal to zero; unlike the mean value of the absolute 
deviation (e), which is always equal to zero by construction under OLS. .   
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Annex C  Calculating fuel demand under assumption of 
continued duty escalator 
The demand for fuel at time t is typically assumed to be given by: 
ln(Qt) =  ln(a)  +  b ln(pt)   +  c ln(Yt)   +    d ln(Qt-1)   +   t           … (5) 
 where Q is the total quantity of fuel consumed (million litres) 
p is the real retail price of fuel (pence per litre) 
Y is the level of economic activity / income (i.e. real GDP) 
  represents other unidentified factors influencing demand  ~ N[0,] 
a, b, c, d are parameters 
 
The short-run price elasticity of demand is given by the parameter b; while the long-run elasticity is 
given by b / (1 – d). 
 
Denoting the actual variable values by the superscript * and the values under the continued fuel 
duty escalator (from time t = T) by the superscript # then, assuming that the continuation of the 
escalator would not have had any impact on the level of economic activity (or any other unidentified 
factors influencing demand), it follows that: 
Qt*/ Qt
#  =  (pt*/ pt
#)b  (Qt-1*/ Qt-1
#)d     t   T, T 1, T 2, …          … (6) 
Consequently, the percentage impact on demand in each time period can be calculated iteratively, 
noting that the value of QT-1*/ QT-1
# = 1 by definition.    
 
The values of the parameters b and d are derived from the values provided in the review of price 
elasticities undertaken for the Department of Transport by Goodwin et al (2004).  Short term and 
long term price elasticities for fuel consumption averaged -0.25 and -0.64 respectively (see Table C1), 
implying that b = -0.25 and d = 0.61 (i.e. 1 – 0.25 / 0.64).  However, these values relate to annual 
data (i.e. the short term elasticity gives the impact after one year) and need to be converted to 
equivalent quarterly values as follows: 
dQ   = d 
0.25   = 0.884      bQ  = b ( 1 – d
0.25 ) / ( 1 – d )  =  0.075 
 
Table C1  Price elasticity of fuel consumption 
 Short term Long term 
Mean elasticity - 0.25 - 0.64 
Maximum - 0.57 - 1.81 
Minimum - 0.01 - 0.00 
Number of estimates 46 51 
Source:  Goodwin et al (2004) 
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Annex D  Design of fuel price stabiliser 
a)  Retrospective stabiliser 
Combining equations (1) and (3) and substituting the parameters with their respective estimated 
values gives: 
pt =        b ( q t  +  et )         pt-1       d tt   +   wt              … (7) 
where p is the pre-tax petrol price (pence per litre) 
q  is the fitted long-run trend price of crude oil  (pence per litre)  
t is a time trend 
e  is the short-run deviation from the fitted trend price    
w  represents other unidentified factors influencing pre-tax price   
 , b ,  , d   are the estimated parameter values 
 
But noting that  pt-1  =         b ( q t-1  +  et )       pt-2     d tt-1  +  wt-1 … etc., it follows that 
pt = ( a*      d t*t  )       b q *t        b e*t  +    w*t             … (8) 
where a*   = [ 1  +  c  + c2  +  c3    …  ]   
q *t  = q t       q t-1      
2 q  t-2      
3 q t-3  +  …   
t*t  = tt       tt-1      
2 tt-2      
3 tt-3  +  …   
e*t   =  et       et-1      
2 et-2      
3 et-3  +  …     
w*t   =  wt       wt-1      
2 wt-2      
3 wt-3  +  …     
Thus, the pre-tax price of petrol can be decomposed into a time-varying constant term (At) and three 
terms representing the smoothed14 influence of: 
 the long run crude oil price (Bt = b q *t) 
 short term deviations in the crude oil price (Ct = b e*t ) 
 other unidentified factors ( Dt = w*t  ) 
The estimated value of the smoothing parameter is 0.311 (see Table A1).  Consequently, the 
weighting factors quickly fall close to zero and hence, in practice, the smoothed values can be 
calculated as finite summations over the last twelve months. 
 
The influence of the short term deviations in the crude oil price can therefore be removed by 
introducing a stabiliser: 
st  =   b e*t      b [ et      et-1     
2 et-2   …    
N et-N ]          … (9) 
                                                          
14
  They are equal to the exponentially weighted moving averages multiplied by 1 / (1 – c).   
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Thus, the value of the stabiliser depends not only on the deviation from the trend price in the 
current period, but also the deviations in previous periods.  It is positive (i.e. equivalent to a tax) 
when the (smoothed) deviation from the long term crude oil trend price is negative (i.e. *t < 0).  It is 
negative (i.e. equivalent to a subsidy) when the deviation is positive (i.e. *t > 0).   
 
Noting that E(e) = E() = 0, the expected value (mean) and variance of the stabiliser are respectively: 
E(st)  =   b E(e*t)  =    b [ E(et)      E(et-1)     
2 E(et-2)   …    
N E(et-N) ]  =  0 
Var(st) =  b 
2 [    Ve  ´ ]    
where     =   ( 1,   ,  2, … ,  N ) 
   Ve =   
cov et,et  cov et,et-  
   
cov et- ,et  cov et- ,et-  
   
 
Furthermore, since the component residuals are serially correlated (see Annex B), it follows that the 
stabiliser values are also serially correlated with the same AR(3) form – i.e. 
st  =   b [ et      et-1     
2 et-2   …    
N et-N ]             
=   b [ ( 1 et-1 + 2 et-2 + 3 et-3  + vt )       ( 1 et-2 + 2 et-3 + 3 et-4  + vt-1 )  
    2 ( 1 et-3 + 2 et-4 + 3 et-5  + vt-2 )    …    
N ( 1 et-N-1 + 2 et-N-2 + 3 et-N-3  + vt-N )  ] 
=   b [ 1 ( et-1      et-2     
2 et-3   …    
N et-N-1 )  +  2 ( et-2      et-3     
2 et-4   …    
N et-N-2 ) 
+  3 ( et-3      et-4     
2 et-5   …    
N et-N-3 )  +  ( vt      vt-1     
2 vt-2   …    
N vt-N ) ] 
=  1 st-1 + 2 st-2 + 3 st-3    b v*t               … (10_ 
Thus, the stabiliser follows the same cyclical pattern as the deviations from trend crude oil price. 
 
The M-period moving average value of the stabiliser is given by: 
s t  = [ et +  et-1 +  et-2   …   et-M+1 ] / M               … (11) 
It follows directly that the expected value of the moving average is zero and the variance is given by: 
 ar(s t) =  [  i Vs i´ ] / M
2  
where i   =   ( 1, 1 , 1, … , 1 ) 
   Vs =   
cov st,st  cov st,st-  
   
cov st- ,st  cov st- ,st-  




Thus, the variance of the moving average is equal to the average covariance across all M×M 
combinations of the lagged stabiliser values.  Table C1 shows the values of the variance for the 
stabiliser and for the moving average values over 3, 5 and 8 years – together with the average, 
minimum and maximum values.  The variation in the moving average falls quickly as the length of 
the averaging period increases; with the magnitude of the five-year average fluctuating by less than 
three pence around zero. 
 
Table C1  Variance of stabiliser and moving average values (pence per litre) 
 Stabiliser 
Moving Average 
3 Years 5 Years 8 Years 
Mean -0.07 -0.09 0.11 0.18 
Variance 13.57 1.30 0.71 0.50 
Minimum -17.02 -3.33 -1.38 -0.65 
Maximum 10.40 2.41 1.19 1.06 
Spread 27.42 5.74 2.57 1.71 
 
b)  Prospective stabiliser 
In practice, the value of the stabiliser for any period must be set in advance, before the deviations (e) 
for the latest periods are known.   Given the delay in obtaining price data and the lead-times 
required for implementation, it is likely that the latest available data will be three months old (i.e. 
will relate to period t-3).  However, it is possible to use the use the serial correlation of the 
deviations (as defined by equation (4) in Annex B) to construct forecast values (made at time t-3) for 
the last three periods, i.e. 
 t-2 =  1 et-3  +  2 et-4  +  3 et-5   
 t-1 =  1  t-2  +  2 et-3  +  3 et-4   
 t  =  1  t-1  +  2  t-2  +  3 et-3   
While the forecasts become successively less accurate, the final forecast (for period t) still provides a 
reasonably good fit to the actual deviations in most periods (see Figure D1 below) – with a 
correlation coefficient for the two time series of 0.70. 
Using these forecast values for the deviations, a “prospective stabiliser” can be calculated as15:  
 t  =   b [  t        t-1      
2  t-2      
3 et-3    …     
N et-N ]          … (12) 
 
 
                                                          
15
  It is also possible to use the serial correlation of the stabiliser values (as defined by equation 10) to 
forecast the stabiliser values directly.  However, using the forecast deviations is slightly more accurate 
and requires minimal additional computation. 
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Figure D1  Comparison of actual deviations with forecast values made three months earlier  
(pence per litre) 
  
Figure D2 compares the prospective stabiliser values with the corresponding retrospective values 
over the period April 1994 – June 2010.  There is a reasonably strong relationship between the two 
values for the majority of the period – the correlation between the two time series is 0.74.  However, 
the prospective stabiliser has the incorrect sign in 31 of the 195 constituent months (i.e. 16%) – 
exacerbating the deviations rather than attenuating them as intended.  In most cases, the 
magnitude of the difference was less than 2 pence (e.g. the retrospective stabilizer value is plus 1 
pence rather than minus 1 pence, etc.).  However, in some cases it is significant.  In particular, in 
November and December 2008, the prospective stabiliser failed to reflect the unprecedented 
decline in crude oil prices (the deviation value falling from plus 16 pence in June to minus 10 pence 
in December) and hence remained significantly positive rather than changing sign as required.   
Figure D2  Comparison of retrospective and prospective stabiliser values (pence per litre) 
(a)
 
(Correlation = 0.74) 
 







































The effectiveness of the prospective stabiliser in removing the volatility in the pre-tax petrol price 
due the deviations in the crude oil price from its long run trend can be measured by: 
          
    s t   b  et
   
 
    b  et
   
  
By definition,  = 0 in the absence of any stabiliser, while  = 1 for the retrospective stabiliser (since 
st    b e*t = 0).  For the prospective stabiliser,  = 0.6.  That is, it removes 60% of the volatility due to 
the fluctuations in the crude oil price.  
